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Abstract
The Medicare trust funds face huge prospective deficits by the end
of this decade. This paper discusses trends in six areas that bear on the
Medicare problem: the number of the elderly, their health status, use of
medical care, labor force participation, income, and living arrangements.
Among the most important findings are: 1) a very large increase since 1965
in life expectancy at age 65; 2) a very large increase since 1976 in real
per capita health care expenditures on the elderly relative to expenditures
on persons under age 65; 3) a cross-sectional increase with age in per capita
health care expenditures that is primarily attributable to very large expendi-
tures in the last year of life; 4) a sharp decrease in labor force partici-
pation and a sharp increase in relative income of the elderly since 1965.
The paper concludes by raising questions about the need to reconsider the
definition of the elderly, the need for more flexible labor market arrangements
for older workers, and a need for a social consensus concerning appropriate
care of dying patients.
Victor R. Fuchs
National Bureau of Economic Research
204  Juniper0  Serra Boulevard
Stanford, CA 94305
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"Though much is taken, much abides."
--Alfred Lord Tennyson
Less than one score years ago this nation brought forth a new
system of financing health care for the elderly--Medicare. This system,
conceived as part of a broad thrust toward a "Great Society" and dedicated
to the proposition that high quality medical care should be freely available
to all persons 65 and over, is now the subject of intense re-examination.
The rapid rate of growth of health care expenditures, the growing
resistance to further increases in governmental taxes or deficits, and
the changing circumstances of the elderly make this an appropriate time
to ask (and attempt to answer) basic questions about the economic and
social forces that affect this age group and this program.
Projections of Medicare outlays and revenues indicate very large
future deficits in the Hospital Insurance trust fund and the Supplementary
Medical Insurance trust fund. A wide range of possible solutions to this
problem have been proposed, including modification of benefits, changes
in methods of reimbursement, and discovery of new sources of funds. The other
papers in this volume examine these proposals in detail. This paper attempts
to place the Medicare issue in a broad context by identifying major economic
and social trends that concern the elderly and by briefly considering the
causes and consequences of these trends. I do not discuss Medicare directly,2
but the questions. raised and the data presented will, I hope, contribute
to the formulation of improved public policies regarding health care for
the elderly.
I begin by supposing that a policy maker with a strong interest in
the elderly had disappeared in 1950 and had only recently returned. What
would he or she most need to know about the elderly with respect to their
current situation and the changes of recent decades? In my judgment there
are six areas that are of critical importance: the number of elderly, their
health status, use of medical care, labor force participation, income, and
their living arrangements. I discuss the most dramatic changes in these
areas during the past three decades, indicate how current policies may have
contributed to these changes, and suggest the need for reconsideration of
those policies.
The Number of Elderly
Almost every article and book about the elderly begins by noting
that the percentage of the population over 65 has grown appreciably over
time. Why is there so much interest in this percentage? First, it is
assumed that most men and women aged 65 and over are not at work; therefore,
part of the working generation's output must be transferred to the elderly
through social security payments, private pension plans, direct provision
of services, or other means. The higher the percentage of elderly, the
greater the amount that must be transferred. Second, it is assumed that
health deteriorates with age and that the consumption of medical care
increases. Furthermore, it is argued that even though the decline in
labor income, the deterioration in health, and the increased useof medical care are, for the most part, foreseeable, many elderly cannot
or do not adequately provide for old age by saving or by acquiring
a health insurance policy when young that would protect them later in life.
(Imperfections in insurance markets, problems of adverse selection, and
high administrative and sales costs are said to contribute to this outcome.)
Finally, the rise in the number of elderly increases their political power.
This increase, coming at a time when economic resources are often allocated
through the ballot box rather than the market place, raises the possibility
of bitter political conflict between the elderly and other groups in society.
The definition of old age--that is, the age of eligibility for
retirement and Medicare benefits--is a critical variable in the development
of viable programs for the elderly. Consider, for instance, a hypothetical
population in which the birth rate equals the death rate and everyone dies at
80 years of age. If every man and woman works from ages 20 to 65 and then
retires, the ratio of workers to retirees will be three to one. If. however,
the retirement age is 70, there will be five workers for every retiree, thus
permitting a substantial increase in benefits or decrease in taxes, or both.
It is conventional to define the elderly with reference to the
number of years since birth, but this is largely a concession to administrative
convenience rather than the logical result of a closely reasoned argument.
Individuals "age" at very different rates and, in theory at least, the elderly
could be defined in terms of years until death, e.g., those men and women
who will die within some specified time. For instance, we could look at the
proportion of the population that will die within one year (the crude death
rate). According to this measure the proportion has decreased since 1950.
To be sure, it doesn't make much sense to define infants, children, and4
young adults as "elderly," even if they are close to death. But a count
of persons 65 and over who will die within the next several years is
informative because much of the interest in the elderly revolves around
their need for medical care and other special services. From a different
perspective, a count of persons 65 and over who are not in the labor force
is revealing because it shows the portion of the population that must live
on transfer payments, income from capital, or dissaving.
These alternative views of who is old yield different trends in
the relative importance of the elderly, as may be seen in Table 1. The
first row shows the familiar increase in the proportion of the population
65 and over, from 8.2 percent in 1950 to 11.3 percent in 1980. The second
row, however, shows that if we define the elderly as persons 65 and over who
will die within five years, this number as a percent of the total population
has increased relatively slowly since 1950 and has hardly grown at all since
1965. Sharp declines in age-specific death rates at ages 65 and above have
offset the effect of the increase shown in the first row. On the other hand,
if we define the elderly as persons 65 and over who are out of the labor
force (row 3). that proportion has grown even more rapidly than the percent
over 65.5
Table 1. The "elderly" as a proportion of the total population: alternative
definitions.
Definition 1950 1965 1980
percent
(1) Age 65 and over 8.2 9.5 11.3
(2) Age 65 and over and within 5 years of  deatha/ 2.6 3.0 3.1
(3) Age 65 and over and not in the labor force 6.2 7.9 10.0
tiEstimated  by author.
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census,CurrentPopulation Reports, Series P-25,
No. 310, Table 1 (June 30, 1965); No. 519, Table 2 (April 1974);
No. 917, Table 2 (July 1982).
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United
States, Colonial Times to 1970, Part I, Series 8189-192, 1975.
U.S. Bureau of the  Census,~ Statistical Abstract of the United
States, 1982-83, Table 109, 1982.
Employment and Training Administration, Employment and Training
Report of the President, 1981, Table A-2, 1981.6
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The Health  of the Elderly
One of the big surprises  of recent  years  has been the sharp reduction
in  age-specific  mortality   of older   persons.  Between   1965 and  1980 life
expectancy   at age 65 jumped  from 14.6 to 16.4 years.  This  was a much  bigger
increase  than was expected,  based  on extrapolation  of either  the 1935-65  or
1950-65  trends (see Table  2). The  improvement  is attributable   primarily  to
a decrease  in the risk of death  from heart  disease  or cerebrovascular
disorders   (strokes),   as  may  be  seen  in  Table   3.  Why  death  rates  from these
causes   have plunnneted is not well understood. Analysts  who are technologically
inclined  attribute  most  of the reduction  to better  control of hypertension,
special  coronary  care units in  hospitals,  open heart surgery,   and similar
medical   innovations. Other   observers  credit  changes  in  diet, smoking,
exercise,   and other  aspects  of personal  behavior. We do not know the true
explanation;   there  is probably  some validity  to both points   of view.
Are  people  escaping  fatal heart attacks  and strokes   only to spend
more   years  in poor  health?  That  question   is difficult  to  study  because
measures  of morbidity  and disability  lack the objectivity  of mortality
statistics,   but  in  my  judgment   the  answer   is  no.  Restricted   activity  days
and bed disability  days per hundred  persons  65 and over were  about  the
same  in 1980 as  in 1965 [U.S.  Bureau  of the  Census  19821. The  percent  of
persons   reporting  activity  limitations  due to chronic  conditions  rose somewhat
from  1970 to 1980, but it is doubtful  that this is the  result  of greater
morbidity. For instance,  the percent  of elderly  persons  reporting  hypertension
without   heart  involvement  rose from 6.4 to 13.1  [U.S. Bureau   of the Census
19821.  but  it  is  unlikely   that  hypertension   actually   increased.   Indeed,
direct  measures  of blood  pressure  among  the elderly  over the
same  period  show declines  in average  levels and  a largeI
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Table 2. Life expectancy at age 65, selected years 1935 to 2000.
1935 1950 1965 1980 2000
Actual 12.5 13.9 14.6 16.4
Predicted from 1935-50 trend 15.5
Predicted from 1935-65 trend 15.8
Predicted from 1950-65 trend 15.3
Predicted from 1935-80 trend 18.5
Predicted from 1950-80 trend 18.3
Predicted from 1965-80 trend 19.1
Sources : National Center for Health Statistics, Health, United States, 1982,
U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1982, Table 10.
National Center for Health Statistics. Vital Statistics of the
United States, 1965, "Mortality, Pt. A," Table 5-4, 1967.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United
States, Colonial Times to 1970, Series A-133, 1975.
Dublin, Louis, Health Progress 1936-1945,  A Supplement to Twenty-
Five Years of Health Progress, Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, New York, 1948, Table 6.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States
1982-83, p. 71; 1982.8
Table 3. Age-specific death rates from heart and cerebrovascular
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Other causes 1606 1535 -0.3
Heart and cerebro-
vascular diseases 5261 4065





vascular diseases 13256 9229 -2.4
Other causes 6813 5261 -1.7
Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Health, United States, 1982,
U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1982, Tables 9, 16, 19.9
decline in the percent of the population 65-74 with systolic pressure of 160
or more or diastolic pressure of 95 or more [NCHS 1981 and 1982a]. Taking
all the available mortality and morbidity data into account, I conclude
that the health status of the elderly at any given age has improved in
recent decades and that this improvement is primarily the result of lowered
incidence or severity of heart disease and cerebrovascular disease.
.Death  rates from all other causes at ages 65-84 were virtually the
same in 1980 as in 1965. This relative stability presents a major puzzle.
During those years Medicare substantially improved access to health care
for the elderly, especially the poor. Also, there were many significant
medical advances including new drugs, improved surgical procedures, and
enhanced diagnostic techniques. It is difficult to believe that these
achievements had no beneficial effect. Age-adjusted death rates from malignant
neoplasms (cancer) actually rose between 1965 and 1980 among the elderly,
possibly as a result of increases several decades ago in cigarette smoking
and environmental hazards. It is encouraging to note that cancer mortality
has declined for males 35-44; perhaps similar declines will begin to show up
at older ages as the cohorts with fewer cigarette smokers reach that point
in the life cycle.
Will life expectancy at older ages continue to increase at a rapid
rate? Some experts say 'no," arguing that there is a biologically determined
average limit for the species of about 85 years [Fries 19801. Other observers
contend that recent large declines in the death rate for the  85+ group is
evidence against the existence of that limit [Schneider and Brody  19831.
Both groups agree that additional declines in mortality at ages 65-84 are
possible or even likely; it would, therefore, be prudent to consider the
possibility of such declines in planning future programs for the elderly.10
Health Care Utilization
The role of additional medical care in improving the health of
the elderly is a matter of some dispute. What is beyond dispute
is the increased consumption of medical services by the elderly. Between
1965 and 1981 there was a large increase in health expenditures at all age
levels, but the  share accounted for by persons 65 and over jumped from
23.8 percent to 32.7 percent. This shift has helped to fan the Medicare
financial crisis; it is, therefore, important to examine it in some detail.
Two factors are responsible and they have been about equal in importance:
first, the number of elderly grew more rapidly than the rest of the population;
second, the change in per capita health expenditures by the elderly  outpaced
the rate for persons under 65 (see column 1 of Table 4). The relative
importance of these factors was not the same among the subperiods, however,
as may be seen in columns 2-4. Not surprisingly, per capita expenditures
among the elderly rose rapidly in the years immediately after the enactment
of Medicare (1965-70). From 1970 to 1976 per capita expenditures rose at
about the same rate for both age groups; divergent trends in population
accounted for nearly all of the differential change in expenditures.
During 1976-81, however, a  large~differential  in the growth of per capita
expenditures again emerged. This gap, combined with a continuing difference
in population trends, resulted in a total differential change in expenditures
of 3.8 percent per annum. This was larger than the difference between the
elderly and the rest of the population in the five years immediately
following the introduction of Medicare!
The last eight rows of Table 4 provide additional detail regarding
the surge of spending on the elderly. We see that there was a very sharp11
Table 4. Rates of change of health care expenditures, by age. 1965-81
(percent per annum).
1965-81 1965-70 1970-76 1976-81
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a/Adjusted  for inflation by the Gross National Product deflator.
Sources : U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-25,
No. 519 and 917, Table 2.
Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President, 1982,
Table B-3.
Fisher, Charles R., "Differences by Age Groups in Health Care Spending,"
Health Care Financing Review, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Spring  19801,
pp. 65-90, Table A.
Provisional data from the Health Care Financing Administration.12
deceleration in public spending on persons under 65, while the trend
increased slightly for the elderly. Private spending, on the other hand,
held steady for persons under 65 and accelerated sharply for those over
that age. With respect to type of expenditure, it was physicians' services
that experienced the most rapid increase among the elderly.
What accounts for these divergent trends? One possibility is that
increasing competition among physicians for patients led more of them to
concentrate on the older men and women in their practice. Another possibility
is that the new medical and surgical interventions have been particularly
applicable to older persons. These speculations indicate why it is so
difficult to predict expenditures on medical care, either in the aggregate
or for particular age groups or particular types of service. Sudden advances
in medical technology--new drugs, new diagnostic techniques, new surgical
procedures--can dramatically alter utilization. In addition, modifications
in insurance coverage, or in reimbursement methods, or in the number of
physicians can alter the balance of demand and supply, thus inducing changes
in the way physicians treat patients and the way patients use physicians.
Whatever the cause, the upsurge in per capita expenditures of the elderly
is a major factor in the prospective deficits in Medicare.
Does utilization rise with age? Analysts interested in projecting
future health care utilization by the elderly have frequently noted that
the age distribution within the 65-and-over group is shifting toward the
older ages and that utilization (as reflected by Medicare reimbursements)
rises steadily with age (see first three columns of Table 5). Under the
assumption that the cross-sectional age-spending relationship holds constant
over time, the effect of the change in age distribution is estimated by13
Table 5. Reimbursement per Medicare enrollee by age and sex, 1976 (dollars).
Actual Adjusted
All Men Women All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
67-60 518 57% 471 624 654 595
69-70 555 613 511 649 667 630
71-72 603 674 551 679 704 660
73-74 657 717 613 712 713 705
75-79 736 793 699 732 716 742
80-84 818 854 798 717 679 741
85+ 666 937 a32 595 594 595
Source: Health Care Financing Administration, Office of Research and
Demonstrations, Health Care Financing Program Statistics "Medicare
Sunary, Use and Reimbursement by Person, 1976-1978," August 1982,
Baltimore, MO, pp. 53 and 61. Adjusted expenditures calculated by
author.14
applying the cross-sectional data on age-specific expenditures to the
change in the age distribution.
Although this procedure is widely used, implicitly if not explicitly,
it is incorrect. TO the extent that the change in the age distribution is
the result of rising life expectancy (i.e., falling age-specific death rates),
the cross-sectional differences in expenditures by age overestimate the
changes that would result from an aging population. Health care spending
among the elderly is not so much a function of time since birth as it is a
function of time to death. The principal reason why expenditures rise with age
in cross-section (among persons 65and over)  isthat the proportion of persons near
death increases with age. Expenditures are particularly large in the last year
of life, and, to a lesser extent, in the next-to-last-year of life. Among
Medicare enrollees in 1976, the average reimbursement for those in their
last year of life was 6.6 times (and in their next-to-last-year of life 2.3
times) as large as for those who survived at least two years [Lubitz and
Prihoda 19821. As age-specific death rates fall over time, there will be
fewer people in the last year of life in any age category, and this will
tend to reduce age-specific health care expenditures.
Age-sex-specific expenditures adjusted for age-sex differences in
death rates can be calculated by a method analogous to the indirect method
of calculating age-sex adjusted death rates. Suppose that each person's
expenditures depended only on their survival status, e.g., last year of life,
next-to-last year, or "survivor." We can estimate a "predicted" expenditure
for each age-sex group by multiplying the proportion in each survival status
by the all-group average expenditure for each survival status and summing
across the three statuses. The higher the death rate of the group, the15
higher would be its "predicted" expenditures. The ratio of actual to
"predicted" expenditures for a group tells us whether expenditures are
relatively high or low after adjusting for its death rate. This ratio
multiplied by the average expenditure for all groups yields the adjusted
expenditure for the  gr0up.u
As may be seen in the last three columns of Table 5 and in Figure 1,
adjustment for age-sex differences in survival status eliminates most of
the age-related increase in expenditures, especially the very high expenditures
in the S-and-over group. It also eliminates the excess of male over female
expenditures at given ages. The only reason why older men  use  more medical
care than older women at any given age is because a higher proportion of the
men are in their last year of life.
I do not claim that there is  no effect of aging on health care
utilization apart from the proximity to death, but much of the apparent
effect is attributable to the relationship between age and mortality. This
'Let X = expenditures per person
N  = number of persons
P = predicted expenditures per person
y,'  I expenditures adjusted for age-sex differences in
survival status
.g = age-sex group  9
t = all age-sex groups
S = survival status  r













































Figure 1. Medicare reimbursement per enrollee by age and sex,
actual and adjusted for survival status, 1976.
70 k0 85 Ageobservation would be of little consequence if mortality rates were constant
over time, but they are not. Between 1965 and 1978 the age-adjusted death
rate of persons 65 and older fell from 65 per 1,000 to 53 per 1,000.
If age-specific death rates continue to fall at this rate, 75-year-olds
in 1987 will face the same probability of death as 71-year-olds faced in
1965.
How much health care will 75-year-olds  utilize in 1987? The answer
will depend upon many factors, including changes in medical technology,
the strengthening or weakening of family support systems, and revisions in
Medicare reimbursement policies. But to the extent that fewer 75-year-olds
will be in the last or next-to-last year of life, a simple extrapolation
from past utilization of  75-year-olds  is inappropriate.
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Kenneth G.  Manton  [1982] reaches a similar conclusion from a model
that emphasizes the distinction between the hypothetical age trajectory of
mortality risk for individuals and the age trajectory for a cohort. He writes
"As mortality rates decline at a given age, there would be some compensating
decline in the rate of utilization of certain health services (e.g.. nursing
home care) before that age. In fact, such models might be used as the basis
for improving projections of health service utilization by providing estimates
of the likely change in health-service-utilization rates associated with a
given mortality reduction" [Manton  1982, p. 2051.
The relationships between utilization, age, and survival status will
depend on the reasons for the lower death rate. If mortality falls because
people are living healthier lives or because of more effective preventive
measures, the conventional extrapolations will over-estimate health care
utilization. as demonstrated above. On the other hand, if the lower death18
rates are the result of ever more complex technological interventions, the
rising cost of such interventions will tend to offset the fact that fewer
persons are in the last year of life.
Labor Force Participation
Between 1950 and 1980 the labor force participation rate of men 65
and over fell from 46 percent to 19 percent. Participation rates of men 55-64
have also dropped sharply in recent years, from 83 percent in1965 to 72 percent
in 1980. What accounts for these striking declines? Many explanations have
been offered, including poor health, mandatory retirement rules, age
discrimination, rising wages, and improved social security benefits.
Health. When older men are surveyed about  their,labor  force status,
those not participating frequently cite ill health as the reason. These
replies have been viewed with some skepticism because ill health may be
offered as a socially acceptable reason for not working when the true
explanation lies elsewhere. A longitudinal analysis of retirement patterns,
however, revealed that poor health is a good predictor of which men currently
at work will not be working four years later [Fuchs 19821. This relationship
does  I&, however, explain why participation19
by older men is so much lower now than it was 30 years ago. As noted, the
health of the elderly has probably improved, and the occupational structure
has shifted away  from blue collar jobs requiring heavy physical exertion.
Thus, at any given age probably fewer men are compelled to leave the labor
force for health reasons now than in earlier decades. Therefore we must
look to other factors.
Mandatory retirement and age discrimination. According to some
popular discussions, men stop working because of mandatory retirement or
because they are victims of age discrimination. In my judgment neither of
these explanations has been a significant factor in the long-term downward
trend in labor force participation. First, about half of all currently
retired men were never subject to mandatory retirement rules [Schulz 19761.
Furthermore,,many  workers retire before the mandatory age, many retire
willingly at the mandatory age, and some are not working for other reasons
such as ill health.
Mandatory retirement rules are usually part of a total labor contract,
either explicit or implicit, that provides workers with stable or even rising
wages until retirement, even though their productivity may decline during
their last years of employment. If older workers are being paid more than
they're currently worth, when they lose their jobs through mandatory
retirement they obviously have difficulty obtaining a new job at their old
wage rate.
The gap that develops between the wages of some older workers and
their productivity is one reason why we hear complaints about "age
discrimination." It is obvious that many employers prefer younger to older1
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workers, but this  his not "discrimination" in an economic sense if age affects
productivity or labor costs. For instance, the older worker may expect a
higher wage even though his productivity does not justify the wage differential.
Even if there is no wage-productivity gap, the fringe benefits of older
workers are often relatively high, especially for health insurance, life
insurance, and pension benefits. As the share of fringe benefits in the
total compensation package increases , it becomes increasingly uneconomic for
firms to hire older workers. If.there  appears to be more age discrimination
now than there was 30 years ago, it is probably because of the changes in
wages and fringe benefits that make it less attractive to hire older workers.
Decline of self-employment. One factor that probably does contribute
to the downward trend in participation by older men is the declining
importance of self-employment. Self-employed men are more likely to continue
working at older ages than are wage-and-salary workers, holding constant
education, age, health, wages, and other relevant variables [Fuchs 19821.
Wage-and-salary workers typically face more rigidity in hours and wages,
while the self-employed find it easier to reduce their hours of work without
changing their occupation or job. The proportion of workers who are
self-employed has declined drastically throughout the 20th century because
of the shift of employment from agriculture to industry and service. Even
within each sector,  self-.employment  has declined in relative importance as
small farms and small businesses find it increasingly difficult to compete
with larger enterprises.
Real wages. Some economists argue that the growth of real wages
in the economy as a whole is a major reason for the decline in iabor force
participation of older men, although this conclusion does not flow directly21
from economic theory. An increase in participation would be equally
consistent with theory because the higher the wage, the higher the price
of not working. But higher wages also mean higher income and the income
effect increases the demand for leisure. It is difficult to predict whether
the price or income effect will dominate.
For women of prime working age higher real wages have resulted in
more labor force participation, not less. In the case of older men, however,
it appears that the income effect is larger than the price effect. This would
explain why the labor force participation of older men has declined in the
United States as real income has risen. One problem with this explanation
is that participation rates of older men in Europe are as low as in the
United States, even though real income is not as high. To be sure, these
countries typically have generous public pensionplans that facilitate
retirement. But why do they have such plans? The increasing number of
elderly may  be,the  answer, partly because of the political power that
numerical strength confers and partly because younger workers want the older
ones to leave the labor market.
Number of elderly. The growth in the proportion of elderly probably
contributes to their low participation rate. When there are relatively few
older people, the population has a pyramid-like age structure similar to the
hierarchical structure of most organizations; the relatively few older workers
can more easily progress up the organizational ladder. Currently in the
United States and in most European countries the age distribution is more
rectangular in shape, but organizations still have a pyramid-like hierarchy
with fewer and fewer openings the higher up one goes. Thus if most older
workers stayed in the labor force, they would find it impossible to move up
within their organizations.22
Social Security. Probably one of the most important reasons why
the labor force participation of older men has declined so rapidly is the
unusual growth of social security benefits. Between 1970 and 1980 average
retirement benefits (adjusted for inflation) increased by more than 3 percent
per annum, while hourly earnings did not even keep pace with inflation.
There is no doubt that public policy has made it increasingly attractive
for older people to stop work--by increasing retirement benefits relative
to wages, by offering an early retirement option at 62, and by withholding
benefits from eligible retirees at the rate of 50 cents per dollar of earnings
on earnings above a prescribed rate.
The trend toward earlier retirement, combined with greater life
expectancy, will place a tremendous burden on those workers who remain in
the labor force (as noted on page 3). To reverse this trend, however, wil 1
probably require major changes in the structure of jobs and labor markets
as well as changes in the structure of social security retirement benefits.
Income
From a purely financial perspective, today's older Americans are
much better off than their predecessors. They have more income and more
wealth (adjusted for inflation) than any previous generation of elderly.
Their real income has risen not only in absolute terms but also relative
to the income of the working population, primarily because of the rapid
growth of social security retirement benefits. It is true that household
income when the householder is 65 or over is only half of that in the
age range 45 to 64, but this figure must be adjusted for household size.23
In 1980 the households of the elderly had on average only 1.74 persons,
compared with 2.83 persons when the householder is 45-64. Taxes also make
a big difference. The elderly's taxes (federal and state individual income
taxes, property taxes on owner-occupied housing, and payroll taxes) are
estimated to be only 13 percent of their income, while the 45-64 age group
pay taxes equal to about 25 percent of income [U.S. Bureau of the Census  19831.
Thus the after-tax income per household member of the elderly is almost equal
to that of the 45-64 age group.
Not only does the average older person receive an after-tax income
comparable to that he or she received at younger ages, but income is more
Consider the following equally distributed after age 65 than before that age.
analysis of incomes based on the Retirement History Survey, a longitudinal
study of approximately 11,000 individuals [Hurd and Shoven 19831. In 1968
when the respondents were 58 to 63 years of age and most were still in the
labor force, the wealthiest 10 percent of the sample had a mean income of
$65,363 (all figures in 1982 dollars), while the poorest 10 percent received
only $1,838. By 1978, however, at ages 68 to 73, with most of the sample
in retirement, the mean income of the wealthiest 10 percent had fallen to
$52,117 while the poorest 10 percent showed a  rise in income to $4,070. The
principal reason for the narrowing of inequality after 65 is that social
security benefits become more important and labor income less important,
and the former is distributed much more equally than the latter.
The improvement in the income position of the  peer elderly has been
particularly striking. As recently as 1970 one out of four persons 65 and
over was below the poverty level, while the proportion among persons under 65
was about one in eight. In 1982 the proportion was the  fame for both age
groups--about one in seven.24
To be sure. money income is only one measure of economic well-being, but
consideration of other factors tends to strengthen the impressionthatthe elderly
are,on average,about as well-off as other age groups. For instance,, persons
over 65 are more likely to own a house free and clear of any mortgage. Also,
the elderly receive a disproportionate share of non-cash transfers such as
subsidized housing, transportation, and medical care. Because they are
typically not in the labor force they have more time for home production
activities such as gardening, repair, and maintenance; they experience fewer
work-related expenses such as commuting and meals away from home, and they
have the opportunity to move to a less costly area of the country.
One disadvantage faced by the elderly is the small size of the
typical household. In 1980 44 percent of their households had only one
person, and 46 percent had only two. Small households are usually not as
efficient as larger ones in the use of space, equipment, food, heat, and
light. The difficulties and disadvantages of doubling up with another older
person in order to gain the economies of a larger household are, however,
apparently considerable. Fewer than 2 percent of elderly households include
members who are unrelated, despite efforts by social agencies to encourage
shared housing.
Although most of the elderly receive an after-tax income that compares
favorably with what they earned while at work, there is a dramatic change in
the source of income after age 65. From ages 25 to 54, earnings account for
more than 90 percent of the total, and between 55 and 64 they still account
for 78 percent of income. For people over 65, however, earnings provide
only 20 percent. Social security retirement benefits are the most important
other source, with capital income such as interest and dividends next in25
importance, followed by government employee pensions, private pensions, and
public assistance.
Does the source of income matter? I think it does. Social security
retirement benefits and other annuity-like income does not flow from assets
which the older person can pass on to children or consume at a pace that he
or she determines. In an earlier era the aged had less total income relative
to younger people than they do today, but more of it came from farms or small
businesses or bits of real estate that they &. Ownership usually
contributes to a sense of power and control and can affect intra-family
relationships. A recent analysis of frequency of visits by children to their
elderly parents found that the number of visits was positively related to the
parents' bequeathable wealth (e.g., stocks, bonds, bank accounts, real estate),
but not to non-bequeathable wealth (e.g., social security, private pensions)
[Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers  19831. If seniors today are "doing better





























Living  and Oying
A wide  variety  of demographic,  social,  and economic  forces  have
resulted   in major  changes   in how the  elderly  live and  die. For instance,
the male-female  differential  in death rates and the tendency  of older
widowed  and divorced  men to choose  younger  wives  when  they remarry  create
a  large surplus   of unmarried   women  above   the,age  of  65. This  surplus  has
grown  in recent  decades  because  female  life expectancy  has grown  much
more  rapidly  than male. In 1980 there were  almost  four unmarried
women  65 and over for every  unmarried  man of that age,  a steep  increase
from  a ratio of less than two to  one in 1940. The greatest  change  occurred:
among  the widowed. In 1940 there  were  approximately  two elderly  widows  for
every   widower,   but  by  1980  there  were   more   than  five.  The  huge  rise in the
number  of elderly  widows  has been accompanied  by a dramatic  change  in their
living  arrangements. In  1950 one in four was living  alone;  the  other  three
were   living with  children,  other  relatives,   or friends. By 1980 two out
of three  widows  65 and over were  living  alone,  and only one in three was
sharing   living  quarters   with  someone   else. Most  elderly  men  are married.
Even at ages 75 and above,  two out of three men are living  with  their  wives,
but only one woman  in five has a husband.
There  has been a great  deal of hand-wringing  about  the decline  of
three-generation  households,  but historians  have hastened  to point  out that
in  Western  Europe  and the United  States  the three-generation   household  has
always  been the exception,  not the rule. We can accept  their  conclusion
that most  households  did not contain  an aged mother  or father,  but it does
not follow  that only a small fraction  of aged men and women  lived with  their
children.   When  mortality is high and the  population  is growing  rapidly,  it is27
possible for most of the elderly to live with their children even though
only a minority of children have elderly parents living with them. For
example, if each woman has two daughters, and if half of the women survive
into old age, only one daughter in four would have her mother living with
her, even if every one of the survivors were living with a daughter. As
an indication of how longer life expectancy and falling birth rates have
raised the mother-to-daughter ratio, the number of women 65 and over relative
to those 35-44 doubled between 1950 and 1980.
In addition to these demographic changes, rising real income contributes
to the decrease in the number of mothers who double up with their children
[Michael, Fuchs, and Scott 19801. Americans of all ages have always put a
high value on autonomy; therefore, the rising income of recent decades and
the particularly rapid rise  in, the income of the elderly have made it
possible for an ever higher percentage of them to maintain their own
households, health permitting.
Health is also an important factor in living arrangements. In
earlier times, poor health was often the reason why older men and women
moved in with their children. At present, poor health often results in a
move to a nursing home. The number of elderly in nursing homes increased
at an astonishing 7 percent per annum between 1963 and 1977, to a total
of over 1.1 million. On any given day 5 percent of all elderly live in
nursing homes, and between 20 and 25 percent will do so at some point in
their lives. Of those who do enter, only one in four returns to a private
or semiprivate residence; one-half are transferred to another health facility
(usually a short-term general hospital), possibly to die or to return to the
nursing home.28
Why have nursing homes become so important? Rising income, the
increased propensity to live alone, higher mother-to-daughter ratios, and
higher labor force participation rates by young and middle-aged women are
all  part~of  the answer. There are many more elderly people who need care
and attention, and relatively fewer children who are providing it within
the home. Public policy also influences the decision because frequently
nursing home care is paid for by government (57 percent of the total in
1981), but the cost of home care is borne mostly by the family through
out-of-pocket expenditures and the foregone earnings of the caregiver.
Economic and social factors also affect the location and manner
of death. According to a report from the National Center for Health
Statistics(l982b), 62 percent of deaths of persons 65 and over occur in
a hospital or medical center, often at great cost. In some cases the
patient is hospitalized because there is a reasonable chance to postpone the
death through the kinds of medical intervention that are only possible
within a hospital setting. In other cases, however, the patient is taken
to the hospital to die because public and private insurance pays more fully
than if the dying person is cared for at home. And in still other cases,
there is no one close enough, either geographically or emotionally, to
offer any alternative to hospitalization.
The cost of caring for very ill patients can vary enormously,
depending upon the patient and the physician [Garber, Fuchs, Silverman
forthcoming]. In some cases the intensive application of modern technology
can prolong life for one or two months or perhaps even more. This type of
decision has traditionally been left to the patient and his or her physician,
but exploding costs may lead to a reexamination of that position. At a
minimum, there will be a search for less costly alternatives, and a closer
examination of the factors that influence such decisions.A Final Note
The data presented in this paper and the accompanying discussion are
meant to be suggestive, not definitive. Large gaps in our understanding of
the aging process and of the determinants of labor force participation,
health care utilization, and other key variables make it difficult to draw
firm conclusions. It may be useful, however, to state explicitly some of
the major themes that are implicit in the preceding pages. Most important
is the need to recognize that the "Medicare problem" reflects the intersection
of two larger sets of issues. First, there are a range of questions concerning
the elderly in general: questions of retirement benefits, age of eligibility,
wages and hours of work, and the like. Second, there are questions concerning
the financing, organization, and delivery of health care for persons of all
ages. Any Medicare "solution" that fails to consider these larger issues
will probably turn out to be counter-productive.
Also implicit in this paper is the need to recognize that resources
devoted to the elderly are resources that could be used to help children,
teenagers, minorities, and other groups with special claims to public attention.
To say this is not to deny that there are many elderly who are poor, sick,
lonely, or otherwise disadvantaged. But the growing political power of the
.elderly suggests the possibility of disproportionate attention to this group
at a time when many small children are neglected or abused, when the schools
are at a low ebb, and when teenage suicide is at epidemic proportions.
Twenty years ago the plight of the elderly was palpable. Today the most
lie elsewhere. The "good society" needs to balance
choices among many worthwhile objectives.
pressing social needs may
its efforts, to make hard
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These considerations, and the data presented in this paper, lead me
to hazard three inferences that have direct relevance for policy. First,
we need to periodically revise our definition of who is old. One way to do
this is to focus on changes in life expectancy at older ages. For instance,
in 1935 when the age of eligibility for social security retirement benefits
was set at 65, life expectancy at that age was 12.5 years. In 1984 the
average 72-year-old has that same life expectancy. From that point of view
it is not unreasonable to say that if 65 marked the entry into old age in 1935,
in 1984 old age begins at 72.
Second, we need to develop more flexible labor market arrangements
to facilitate the continued labor force participation of older men and
women. Unless this happens, the ratio of workers to retirees will become
so small as to pose a grave threat to our economy and our society. Simply
passing laws against mandatory retirement and age discrimination will not
solve the problem. We need to develop more flexibility in hours of work,
in wages (to  accommodate  possible age-related declines in productivity),
and in  amou'nt  of responsibility (to speed the movement of younger men and
women into positions of leadership within organizations).
Finally, and this may Prove to be the most difficult task of all,
we need to reach a social consensus concerning what is appropriate care
for the dying. At present the United States spends about one percent of
the gross national product on health care for elderly persons who are in
their last year of life. This is much more than the nation spends on
institutional care for the mentally ill and the mentally retarded of all
ages, more than private and public expenditures for basic and applied
research in all fields, and more than the total expenditures of all the31
private colleges and universities in the country. On the other hand, it
is  1eSS than is spent on alcohol, and not much more than is spent on tobacco.
HOW much should be spent on care for the 1.3 million elderly persons
who die each year? For most goods and services our society answers this
question by saying "Let the market decide." According to economic theory
the free choice of knowledgeable buyers paying with their own money for
services rendered by competitive suppliers should result in a socially
efficient allocation of resources. It will not necessarily be a "fair"
allocation, but this problem is supposed to be addressed through redistribution
of income, not direct subsidization of particular services.
This free market approach is not likely to work well for the
seriously ill. Patients and their families are often under great emotional
stress and they typically have little previous experience with the complex
technical choices that must be made. The hospitals and physicians who serve
them often have considerable monopoly power. Furthermore, even in the
absence of public subsidies, private insurance would push utilization beyond
the point where benefits are equal to cost. The problem of distributive
justice is not amenable to solution through conventional income redistribution
methods because the amount society would want to give to an individual would
depend on how much care they needed. Some economists would prefer an
indemnification plan  that,provides  old people with additional income when
they become sick and lets them decide how much to spend for medical care.
This plan  may be a delight to some theorists, but it would be a nightmare
for most patients and physicians.
It is possible to nibble at the edges of the problem by providing
more information to patients, by fostering more competition among providers,32
by financing alternative modes of care for the dying, and by increasing
deductibles and co-insurance. The fundamental problem, however, will remain.
One of the biggest challenges facing policy makers for the rest of this
century will be how to strike an appropriate balance between care for the
dying and health services for the rest of the population.33
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